Nineteenth-Century Literature Criticism
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Criticism of the Works of Novelists, Philosophers, and Other Creative Writers Who Died between 1800 and 1899, from the First Published Critical Appraisals to Current Evaluations

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Garshin


[In the following essay, Tumanov describes a narrative innovation in Garshin’s war story “Four Days” that allows the communication of a character’s thoughts without mediation and in real time. Through “direct interior monologue,” readers directly apprehend the protagonist’s experiences, and the events of four days are represented within a short span of pages.]

Vsevolod Garshin’s “Four Days” is the story of a wounded soldier left for dead on a deserted battlefield. During four days of physical and mental agony, he reassesses his formerly idealistic attitude towards war and ends up condemning it as something far from glorious and noble. However, the importance of Garshin’s short story in literary history is not so much its anti-war message as the innovative nature of the form used to convey that message. Garshin was the first to explore the potential of direct interior monologue (hereinafter: DIM): a technique which seeks to create the artistic illusion that the reader is eavesdropping on a character’s inner discourse without any mediation on the part of a narrator (cf. Stenborg: p. 127; Cohn: p. 180). Because Garshin’s text anticipated many of the devices later used by such masters of the genre as James Joyce and William Faulkner, the form of “Four Days” merits close analysis.

At the same time, it must be stressed that since Garshin’s story represents the birth of DIM as we know it today, it is by no means uniform in the way it seeks to represent an ongoing thought process. Given the absence of a formal tradition in this area, it is understandable that Garshin’s text seems to vacillate between (a) a form required by the premise that we are eavesdropping on a private thought process and (b) more traditional forms of conventional first-person narrative. The present article is an attempt to determine the extent to which “Four Days” succeeds in creating the illusion of private communication.

Private communication, i.e. non-written inner discourse aimed at no one but the self, can be suggested by a literary text only in contrast to such common forms of public communication as conventional first-person narration: usually written discourse intended for a reader. Therefore, the illusion of self-communication can be achieved when such typical features of conventional narrative as explicitness, coherence and completeness are avoided as much as possible: the less a DIM sounds like conventional narration or any other kind of public discourse, the more ‘realistic’ it appears (Cohn: pp. 174-75). This is borne out by the evolution of the genre: Molly Bloom’s interior monologue at the end of Ulysses, considered by many to be the finest example of DIM, appears to be intended for no one but the heroine precisely because it sounds nothing like narration or any other kind of public discourse. The same can be said about the first two parts of Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury.


7. N. A. Demchinskii, ‘Sladkie griezy. Vospominaniiia o V. M. Garshine,’ Sovremenniki o V. M. Garshine, p. 133. The reference is to the projected story “Nadezhda Nikolaevna.”


12. All quotations are taken from V. M. Garshin, Izbrannoe (Moscow, Pravda, 1985).


14. For a definition of epic and quasi-dramatic types of narrative, see K. A. Dolinin’s Interpretatsiia teksta (Moscow, 1985), p. 149, on which we have drawn in this analysis.


17. Garshin, Pis’ma, p. 356.
Thus we have two different communicative premises in DIM and in narration respectively: the former implies that addresser and addressee are the same person, while the latter does the opposite. Because of the way Garshin’s text deals with this problem, ambiguity is often created; at times lapping into a narratorial style, “Four Days” sometimes appears to rest on private and public communication premises simultaneously.

However, in spite of the text’s numerous narratorial features, Garshin here introduced at least one major innovative device: the use of the punctual present in the main story-line. This form of the present tense ‘synchronizes verbalization with action or experience’ (Cohn: p. 191), and even though the illusion of absolute synchronisation is not always achieved in Garshin’s story, we have a clear sense that an attempt is being made to do so. Thus, in a number of instances Ivanov’s verbalisation and experience are close enough to create the sense that the action is taking place ‘here and now,’ in sharp contrast to the inevitably retrospective stance of the conventional narrator: ‘I’m awake. Why do I see stars shining so brightly in the blue-black Bulgarian sky? Am I not in my tent? . . .’ (pp. 22-23).

The significance of Garshin’s reliance on the punctual present tense in his DIM has to do with the fact that narration is oriented retrospectively: its logical tense must be the past or sometimes the evocative present which, unlike the punctual present, is a retrospectively oriented tense (Cohn: pp. 190-203). It would be illogical for a writing narrator to use the punctual present, which ‘synchronizes verbalization with action or experience’ (cf. Cohn: ibid.), since he can write down his account of events only post factum. It would make even less sense for a speaking narrator to use the punctual present, since it would imply that he is relating events taking place right before his listener’s eyes which, unless the listener is blind, is a waste of effort. It is only when the addressee and the addresser are the same person, as is the case in DIM, that the punctual present becomes logically acceptable: the character is not narrating, but registering his experience in the form of inner discourse or verbalisation (cf. Cohn: p. 173). This is why Garshin’s “Four Days” is so innovative: even though the hero’s style is narratorial in many ways, it represents an attempt at a fundamental break with narrative as a communicative situation. The author clearly seeks to eliminate retrospection from the main story-line by closing the temporal gap between histoire and discours.

Furthermore, in a story where the protagonist’s life is in grave danger, present-tense DIM creates the kind of suspense that it is virtually impossible to achieve in traditional first-person (retrospective) narrative. In the latter, the very fact of narration normally indicates that the hero has survived to tell the tale, and no matter how much internal focalisation is used, the reader still knows that ‘I was about to die’ usually implies ‘but I didn’t.’ Present-tense DIM inevitably excludes such a comforting guarantee. In Garshin’s text we are given only the ‘here and now’ perspective of the experiencing self because there is no narrating self to begin with and therefore no solace of a retrospective point of view. When Garshin’s protagonist thinks: ‘Yes, I’ve been wounded in battle. Is it serious or not?’ (p. 28), we know that these wounds could be fatal. This results in greater suspense and a keener sense of empathy: we can identify more easily with someone who does not know his future because we do not know ours either.

However, Garshin’s story illustrates the difficulty of working with a new fictional premise, since the punctual present is not used consistently throughout the protagonist’s verbalisation of on-going experience. At times Ivanov lapses into a retrospective style by using what amounts to the evocative present and even the purely narratorial past. This is the first record of his initial physical sensations after he regains consciousness on the deserted battlefield.

Never have I been in such a strange situation. I seem to be lying on my stomach and can see nothing ahead of me but a tiny patch of ground. A few blades of grass; an ant crawling down one of them; some stalks of dead grass left over from last year—that’s my entire world. And I see it with only one eye, because the other is pressed shut by something hard, probably a branch, with my head resting on it. I’m horribly uncomfortable, I want to move and have no idea why I can’t. So time passes. I can hear the chirp of grasshoppers, the buzzing of a bee. That’s all. At last, with an effort, I free my right hand from underneath me and, pressing both hands against the ground, try to get up on my knees.

Up to ‘so time passes’ we have the impression that the author intends Ivanov’s mental discourse and his physical experience to appear simultaneous: the hero is not narrating, but merely registering the external world. However, with ‘so time passes’ a summary effect is introduced: the present tense is now evocative, since such a statement implies that Ivanov is looking back on events and taking stock of the situation. The end of the above-cited passage is even more narratorial, since ‘at last, with an effort’ implies that the protagonist sees this particular action as the end of a series, and it is only in retrospect, i.e. in narrative, that one can classify anything into sets and determine which element is the last.

The greatest amount of communicative ambiguity is created by the last sentence of the story. When Ivanov is rescued and has a leg amputated in the hospital, he says something that turns his whole DIM on its head and contradicts the entire preceding present-tense account: ‘I can talk and tell them everything that’s written down here’ (p. 32). At this point “Four Days” becomes a paradoxic form of discourse, the initial attempt to synchronise discourse and experience is cancelled out by the conventional
retrospective position of a narrator. The fact that Ivanov’s last statement is itself in the present tense underscores its contradictory implications: ‘... if we view the story in retrospect from this conclusion, it now no longer appears as an autonomous monologue, but as a retrospective narrative cast entirely in an evocative present tense. In sum: a make-believe interior monologue, which gives away its slight of hand only when its last sentence closes a sentence-thin frame of retrospection—which was never opened’ (Cohn: p. 204). However, this complete and overt ‘narratorialisation’ of the text takes place only at the last moment. Until then the reader is under the impression that this story is an attempt at creating a present-tense DIM. As a result, two texts are created: the text initially read by the reader and then a second post-lecturam text, which is reassessed after the reading process ends. This more than anything illustrates the communicative ambiguity of Garshin’s text and the difficulty of ‘inventing’ a technique. If we consider DIM texts written later on, e.g. Dujardin’s Les lauriers sont coupés or Schnitzler’s “Leutnant Gustl,” there is no longer any hint of such communicative ambiguity.

The ‘struggle’ of the punctual present tense with the evocative present and the past tense is part of a larger theoretical problem inherent in DIM: scene versus summary (cf. Friedman: p. 1169). Only a narrator looking back on events can summarise by accelerating or condensing experience. Because a DIM thinker is merely registering his experience and portrays a bizarre and unreal world (cf. Friedman: p. 1169). However, this complete and overt ‘narratorialisation’ of the text takes place only at the last moment. Until then the reader is under the impression that this story is an attempt at creating a present-tense DIM. As a result, two texts are created: the text initially read by the reader and then a second post-lecturam text, which is reassessed after the reading process ends. This more than anything illustrates the communicative ambiguity of Garshin’s text and the difficulty of ‘inventing’ a technique. If we consider DIM texts written later on, e.g. Dujardin’s Les lauriers sont coupés or Schnitzler’s “Leutnant Gustl,” there is no longer any hint of such communicative ambiguity.

In this connection, P. Henry points out that ‘this “impressionistic” device ... demonstrates the senselessness of war and portrays a bizarre and unreal world’ (p. 44). Thus the ultimate result of such sensory perception scenes in “Four Days” is defamiliarisation (ostranenie), since the thinker’s sensory experience suddenly becomes something very strange, and the world appears unfamiliar and frightening. War is no longer a cliché of glorious, pure and, above all, uncomplicated action; it is a strange and unintelligible experience into which the reader is introduced, and from the worst possible viewpoint: that of a wounded soldier suffering agonies while alone under the scorching sun.

Although Garshin makes occasional use of the sensory perception scene device, here too, his avoidance of narratorial summary and retrospection is not consistent. When Ivanov notices the Turk’s body for the first time, the illusion of sensory perception in actu is partially compromised by the narratorial ‘Ia vizhu’ (‘I [can] see’); ‘... I can see something large and dark four or five paces away. I can see specks of moonlight glittering on it here and there. Buttons or cartridges. It’s a corpse, or a wounded man’ (pp. 23-24). Any sensation, visual, olfactory, auditory or the feeling of pain, is rendered less immediate, less dramatic and therefore less scene-like when introduced by ‘I see,’ ‘I smell,’ ‘I hear’ or ‘I feel.’ Such introductory statements belong to the realm of a conventional narrator who is not registering his perception verbally as it occurs, but is talking about it post factum. Consequently, the framing phrase ‘I feel’ (‘ia chuvstvuiu’): ‘I can feel the roots of my hair curling’ (p. 23) lessens the immediacy of perception and reduces its scene-like quality. We have the impression that if Ivanov has time to verbalise this feeling with ‘I feel,’ his hair is no longer ‘moving’ at the moment of discourse. This discrepancy is even more apparent when the hero finally identifies the corpse: ‘But it’s getting hot. The sun is burning me. I open my eyes, see the same bushes, the same sky, only now in the light of day. And there’s my neighbour. Yes, it is a Turk, a corpse. How huge he is! I recognise him, it’s that one’ (p. 25). The first two unframed sentences appear as immediate sensory perceptions registered by Ivanov’s inner discourse in actu. His perception of the bushes, however, is more narratorial because of ‘I can see,’ especially when compared to the unframed and more scene-like ‘and here is my neighbour.’ The latter is much more spontaneous than the final sentence which once again returns Ivanov’s discourse into a more retrospective position (‘I recognise him’). Such framed ‘recognition’
reduces the illusion that his discourse and experience are simultaneous, and it appears redundant, since the recognition is already dramatised by ‘it’s that one.’

Similarly, the drama and intensity of Ivanov’s pain are undermined by narratorial framing: ‘I make a movement and feel an excruciating pain in my legs’ (p. 22). Because the sensation of pain is framed by ‘I feel’ (oshchushchishchayu), the immediacy of his anguish is diminished and a summary effect is introduced. This is particularly detrimental to the illusion of simultaneity of discourse and experience. Pain is such an overwhelming sensation that anything suggesting detachment places the person who is supposed to feel pain into a retrospective position. As he is crawling towards the flask, every moment causes him unbearable anguish: ‘I keep on crawling. My feet catch on the ground and every movement is unbearable pain. I scream, scream and howl, but keep on crawling’ (p. 26). The fact that he can think of an adjective to describe his pain suggests that at the moment of discourse the pain is not intolerable and appears to be recalled rather than experienced (cf. Stenborg: p. 128). Moreover, Ivanov merely tells us that he is screaming, which only a retrospective narrator can do, since only after uttering a scream can one say ‘I scream and howl.’

There is the same inconsistency in Ivanov’s verbalisation of memories, which is sometimes framed and sometimes seems to be very immediate. When the thinker recalls a distressing incident from his past—the death of a little dog—his recollection is so framed that he appears to be telling a story to an external addressee:

... it will soon be over. There’ll just be a few lines in the papers about our casualties being insignificant: Wounded—so many... The whole scene flashes vividly in my imagination. It happened long ago... It was a pretty little dog; it had been run over by the carriage of a horse-drawn tram. It lay dying, as I am now. A caretaker pushed the crowd aside, took the little dog by the scruff of its neck and carried it away.

(pp. 24-25)

The purely associative transition from Ivanov’s thoughts of a possible newspaper account of his death, as well as the future tense used to verbalise this hypothetical article (‘there’ll just be’), indicate an attempt to place the thinker’s discourse and experience onto the same temporal plane. However, the framing phrase ‘The whole scene flashes vividly in my imagination’ belies the adverb ‘vividly’: this vividness is reported, not experienced. The narratorial detachment inherent in such framing is especially evident if we compare the last passage with another one, where Ivanov mentally returns to the incident with the dog after saying farewell to his family: ‘Farewell, mother, farewell, my sweetheart, my love! Oh, it’s so hard, so bitter. Something is clutching at my heart... That little white dog again!’ (p. 31). The suddenness of this unframed recollection, and especially the fact that it is in the form of an exclamation, create the impression that the image of the little dog flashes through the thinker’s mind simultaneously with his inner discourse. This is much more vivid than the narratorial use of ‘vividly’ in ‘the whole scene flashes vividly in my imagination.’

The non-reportorial effect of ‘That little white dog again!’ is part of a larger communicative phenomenon. Of the four basic sentence types—declarative/reportorial, interrogative, imperative and exclamatory (Shaw: pp. 33-34)—the most common in conventional retrospective narration is the declarative/reportorial one. V. Artemov views the term ‘narrative’ and ‘declarative/reportorial’ as virtual synonyms (p. 58). Because of the firm association between conventional narrative and the declarative/reportorial mode, the illusion of private communication is reinforced if declarative/reportorial utterances are avoided as much as possible (cf. Cohn: p. 222).

In much of Garshin’s text this ‘neutral report of the present moment’ appears to be the dominant form of the thinker’s discourse: ‘Faint pink spots have started to move around me. The big star has faded, some of the small ones have vanished. It’s the moon rising’ (p. 29). However, in a number of instances Ivanov’s discourse is distanced from narrative by the use of exclamations and questions: ‘I’m awake. Why do I see stars shining so brightly in the blue-black Bulgarian sky? Am I not in my tent?’... (p. 22). Here we no longer feel that he is reporting anything; rather, such spontaneous utterances sound like reactions to immediate experience. Consequently the presence of the stars appears to be taken for granted, as it presumably should be in self-communication. Instead, the focus of attention shifts to the significance of seeing the stars in the thinker’s mind: he did not expect to see them after regaining consciousness and clearly does not know where he is. Thus we learn only indirectly that Ivanov sees those stars: this detail ‘leaks out’ as secondary information, since the hero is concentrating on its meaning. The fact that he is in Bulgaria is disclosed in the same indirect, non-reportorial fashion because it is not central in Ivanov’s utterance. Their spontaneity makes exclamations an especially effective tool for disclosing information and yet avoiding the declarative/reportorial mode. Upon seeing the enemy soldier’s body for the second time, Ivanov discloses the dead man’s size indirectly: ‘And there’s my neighbour. Yes, it’s a Turk, a corpse. How huge he is!’ (p. 25). Similarly, the horror of sharing Ivanov’s experience of watching a dead man decompose is enhanced by the following mental ‘shriek’: ‘It [the corpse] has disintegrated completely. Myriads of maggots are dropping from it. How they squirm!’ (p. 31).

The fact that the last example includes declarative/reportorial and exclamatory utterances side by side confirms that Garshin’s text fluctuates between two mutually exclusive communicative premises: private and public communication, or non-retrospective and retrospective discourse.
Sometimes information is disclosed indirectly, and then, as if the author wanted to make sure that we understand what is going on, the hero repeats the same thing reportorially, i.e. relying on the declarative mode. When Ivanov hears the sounds of a cavalry unit nearby, his inability to see the soldiers and to be seen by them is revealed at first in a way that precludes any type of report: ‘And what if they’re Turks? . . . They’d skin me, roast my wounded legs . . . But what if they are ours? Oh you cursed bushes! Why did you grow and make such a thick fence around me?’ (pp. 29-30). This, however, is immediately followed by essentially the same information, only in a more narratorial form: ‘I can see nothing through them’ (ibid.). Thus we are first given Ivanov’s frustration at being hidden by bushes as a scene and then as a summary. There is another reason for the scene effect in the exclamation ‘Oh you cursed bushes! Why did you grow and make such a thick fence around me?’; this utterance is dialogic, and any form of dialogue—it does not really matter here whether a reply is given or even can be given, since we are still dealing with clearly direct address—by definition constitutes pure scene. As S. Rimmon-Kenan puts it, ‘a quotation of a monologue or a dialogue … creates the illusion of pure mimesis’ (p. 110), which means that summary (diegesis) is excluded by the mere presence of direct ‘convivial’ form. Therefore, dialogic discourse in DIM reinforces the illusion of simultaneous verbalisation and experience.

Interior dialogue in DIM has another advantage. As pointed out above, because conventional narrative models on various forms of public communication tends to be explicit, coherent and complete, DIM, which implies the absence of public communication, sounds more ‘realistic’ if explicitness, coherence and completeness are avoided. Any indication that the thinker’s discourse is taking into account an uninitiated addressee (the reader) risks compromising the illusion of self-communication. However, when interior monologue is replaced by interior dialogue, the need for ‘difficult’ discourse is greatly diminished since dialogue involves an addressee and an addressee. In DIM, interior dialogue suggests a temporary split in the character’s mind, where discourse is no longer genuinely private since something like a conversation is now taking place between two internal interlocutors. 9

In “Four Days” interior dialogue is used quite extensively, providing motivation for much of Ivanov’s coherent, complete and explicit discourse. This dialogue takes a number of forms and the lack of a clear ‘you’ does not necessarily compromise the dialogic nature of Ivanov’s thought process. In dialogue, the ‘interlocutors’ can be any set of antipodal positions (cf. J. Faryno: p. 288). As long as we have the impression that the character’s thought is not developing smoothly but progresses in the form of propositions and reactions to these propositions, an interior dialogue is taking place. For example, two opposing positions, like two separate consciousnesses, are clear from the hero’s thoughts on committing suicide to avoid further suffering. In the following passage we have the impression that two different individuals, who can be called the optimist and the pessimist, are arguing and ‘bouncing ideas off each other’ in order to arrive at a plan of action:

I remember that in The Physiology of Everyday Life . . . the story is told about a suicide who killed himself by starvation. He lived for a very long time, because he drank.

And now what? If I live another five or six days, what will come of that? . . . I’ll die just the same. . . . Isn’t it better to end it? . . .

Well, should I end it or wait? For what? Rescue? Death? Wait for the Turks to come and start stripping the skin off my wounded legs? Better do it myself . . .

No, I mustn’t lose heart; I’ll fight to the end, until my strength is gone. After all, if they find me, I’m saved.

(pp. 26-27)

‘After all’ (ved’), a rhetorical conjunction normally aimed at persuading an interlocutor, stresses the dialogic nature of this passage where the optimist and the pessimist disagree with each other, refute each other’s arguments and mock each other’s respective positions. This ‘socratization’ of Ivanov’s thought process makes it possible to avoid the straightforward narratorial exposition of ideas and suggests self-communication. Thus interior dialogue not only helps to motivate coherent discourse in DIM, but also reinforces the illusion of private communication by eliminating any possibility that the character is addressing a reader or any other public addressee; he is clearly addressing himself in the form of ‘the other.’

The presence of two opposing positions in Ivanov’s DIM is motivated by the fact that the protagonist is suffering from an oppressive sense of guilt at having just killed a human being. His reassessment of such concepts as the enemy, military glory, patriotism, the legitimacy of wartime murder and war in general, at times takes the form of an internal polemic where a new ideological position appears to come into conflict with Ivanov’s previously held idealistic notions. In the following passage one ‘interlocutor’ appears to condemn the other:

Before me lies the man I have killed. Why did I kill him? . . .

I didn’t mean to do it. I meant no harm to anyone when I went to fight. The thought that I too would kill people somehow escaped me. I saw only myself as exposing my breast to the bullets. And I went and did that.

And what of it? Fool, fool! And this wretched fellah . . .

How is he to blame? And even though I’ve killed him, why am I to blame? Why am I to blame?

(pp. 25-26)

This dialogic struggle taking place within the mind of a man trying to come to grips with a terrible realisation.
corresponds to the third category in V. Rinberg’s classification of interior dialogue types: 1) dialogue with an imaginary interlocutor; 2) dialogue with a present interlocutor; 3) polemic, i.e. ‘argument with oneself”; 4) dialogue with the participation of voices from the past, and 5) parallel dialogue . . .’ (p. 34). The first, second and fourth categories are also present in Ivanov’s DIM and, as all instances of interior dialogue in “Four Days,” they are used as devices aimed at dramatising the thinker’s suffering.

A mix of ‘dialogue with an imaginary interlocutor’ and ‘dialogue with a present interlocutor’ is used in some instances where Ivanov mentally addresses inanimate objects, his own feelings or the dead soldier. Instead of simply reporting that he is being tortured by memories of his past happiness, the anguish of reliving these recollections in the context of the present is conveyed as a scene in dialogic form: ‘You memories, don’t torment me, leave me alone! Heartache, heartache!’ (‘Toska, toska!’) You’re worse than wounds’ (p. 25). As in ‘Oh you cursed bushes! Why did you grow into such a thick fence around me?,’ the effect of private communication is especially convincing because the interior dialogue form is coupled with the use of exclamations and interrogatives rather than declarative/reportorial language. Similarly the protagonist’s discourse is distanced from narrative when, instead of making statements about the dead Turk, Ivanov actually addresses him. ‘You are saving me, my victim!’ (p. 26). Rinberg’s fourth category of interior dialogue is represented by the following passage.

My mother, my dear mother! You’ll tear out your grey hair, you’ll beat your head against the wall, you’ll curse the day you bore me, you’ll curse the entire world for inventing war to make people suffer!

But you and Masha will probably not hear about my agonies. Farewell, mother, farewell my sweetheart, my love!

(p. 31)

This dialogic segment not only dramatises Ivanov’s thoughts about how his mother would react to news of his death and renders his farewell to Masha ‘less like narrative.’ Its dramatic and spontaneous quality also enhances the prime purpose of Garshin’s text: the anti-war message, the passage quoted being the author’s thinly veiled denunciation of war. However, the interior dialogue form introduces the semblance of a spontaneous emotional outcry, thereby somewhat reducing the ‘preaching’ effect created by these philosophical comments about war and making them more palatable to the reader.

We have pointed out that interior dialogue in “Four Days” motivates coherent, complete and explicit discourse in a genre where such linguistic clarity would otherwise compromise the illusion of self-communication. And indeed, because Ivanov’s DIM is not entirely dialogic in form and yet virtually everywhere appears coherent, complete and explicit, the self-communication premise is occasionally undermined. In accordance with the main premise of present-tense DIM, the inner verbalisation of on-going experience must preclude any suggestion of a retrospective stance by eliminating all hints of discourse planning. If we consider communication in general, the amount of discourse planning is normally a positive function of the time span separating the discourse and its referent. The assumption here is that the more time a speaker has to consider the referent, assess its significance and establish links between its constituent parts, the more coherent, sophisticated, complex and polished the resulting verbalisation will be. This is in fact confirmed by empirical studies of real-life communication. E. Ochs and B. Kroll have found that planned messages, which normally equate with written discourse, are more complex, explicit and syntactically complete than relatively unplanned messages, which are usually found in spontaneous oral discourse. This difference is intuitively known to virtually all readers from everyday experience. Therefore, given that a DIM character is verbalising in act, any sign of planned (and therefore written) discourse is bound to stand out as a violation of the DIM illusion. The less polished and more fragmented the inner discourse of a thinker in DIM is, the greater is the illusion of unplanned verbalisation. As a result, passages like the following look suspiciously too well-constructed and complex for non-retrospective and unprocessed discourse: ‘Doctors and nurses are standing over me and apart from them I can see a familiar face, that of a famous St Petersburg professor who is bending over my legs’ (p. 35). ‘Bending down’ (naklonivshegosia) makes this passage look planned, since participles are in Russian more typical of written texts rather than of spontaneous oral discourse.

Discourse planning or its absence are evident first of all from sentence structure. By juxtaposing Kroll’s observation with certain instances of DIM in “Four Days,” we discover a number of utterances which imply an ambiguous communicative situation. While these utterances are clearly in the punctual present tense, their complexity betrays a certain amount of discourse planning:

I must turn my head and take a look. It’s easier to do that now, because when I’d come round and seen the blade of grass and the ant crawling down it and tried to get up, I’d fallen into a different position and turned on my back. That’s why I can see those stars.

(p. 23)

The future-oriented first sentence and the present-oriented last one seem to indicate that experience and its verbalisation are simultaneous, but this effect is undermined by the second sentence, which is a sophisticated compound-complex construction with such an intricate set of inter-dependent clauses that the suggestion of spontaneity is seriously in question. The planned nature of that sentence
is indicated by clause subordination and by suspended syntax where constructions are temporarily interrupted by the insertion of phrases and even clauses (periodic sentences, according to Clines).\(^{12}\)

Such planned utterances create an ambiguous communicative situation especially when there is an attempt to clarify the relationship between the various segments of the thinker’s discourse. The illusion of private communication suffers when Ivanov wakes up and thinks: ‘I’m lying with closed eyes, although I’ve been awake for quite some time. I don’t want to open my eyes, because I can feel the sunlight through my closed eyelids: if I open them, then it will sear them’ (p. 24; my italics, V.T.). The use of these subordinating conjunctions suggests that Ivanov’s discourse is intended not just for himself but also for an external, uninitiated addressee who might have difficulty in establishing the relationship between ‘I open my eyes’ and ‘it [the sunlight] will sear them’ without ‘if’ and ‘then’.\(^{13}\) Although Ivanov’s DIM is sometimes made to sound more private by the use of short and unconnected phrases, e.g. ‘I’m lying here totally exhausted. The sun is burning my face and arms. I’ve nothing to cover myself with. If only it would soon be night’ (p. 27), this ‘telegraphic’ style is not prevalent enough to erase the discourse planning effect in most of the text.\(^{14}\)

The needs of a contextually uninitiated external addressee are acknowledged in an even more obvious way when Ivanov inserts explanatory parenthetical comments designed to clarify a potentially ambiguous element. When, after a short digression, Ivanov comes back to the incident of the little dog, he appears to be making sure that the reader is not lost: ‘How good life is! . . . On that day (when the misfortune with that little dog happened) I’d been happy’ (p. 25). The use of parentheses here achieves a discourse planning effect and indicates an attempt to explain the deictic phrase ‘on that day’. Deixes or indexicals—pronouns or adverbs of time and place—are signs which require contextual knowledge on the part of the addressee in order to be deciphered. Because the addressee of DIM is also the addressee, ‘their’ knowledge of context is always equal. One would therefore not expect in private communication the referents of deixtics to be explained, especially in such an overt way.

Equally explicative is the use of verba dicendi in the verbalisation of external dialogue: ‘he said,’ ‘I said.’ Only a narrator reporting a conversation in retrospect has to identify the speakers to his addressee (a reader). A DIM thinker verbalising dialogue in act, on the other hand, is his own addressee and consequently sees each interlocutor ‘right now.’ Thus the use of verba dicendi becomes redundant in DIM and introduces an element of externally-oriented communication, i.e. narrative, into the illusion of internal communication. There is very little external dialogue in “Four Days,” since most of the time Ivanov is alone. However, when he is found by men from his regiment, his verbalisation of external speech introduces narrative elements into the situation and underlines the use of the punctual present tense: ‘I shudder and come to instantly. The kindly blue eyes of Iakovlev, our lance-corporal, are looking at me out of the bushes. “Spades!” he cries’ (p. 32). The same effect is produced by exchanges between the protagonist and a medical officer: “‘Petr Ivanych!’”—I whisper.—“What is it, my dear fellow?’” (ibid.). These and other narratorial elements began to disappear from DIM as the technique developed after “Four Days.”

In Les lauriers sont coupés there are many instances of external dialogue with no verba dicendi. In “Leutnant Gustl” verba dicendi are absent altogether, resulting in exchanges like the one between the protagonist and a waiter in a café: ‘Habe die Ehre, Herr Leutnant!’”—Guten Morgen.”—“So früh heute, Herr Leutnant?”—“Ah, lassen S’nur—ich hab’ nicht viel Zeit, ich kann mit’m Mantel dasitzen.’”—Was befehlen Herr Leutnant?’ (p. 174).\(^{15}\)

Ivanov’s isolation is not only a way of motivating his interior monologue, but it also gives him a chance to rethink the morality of war. The story’s form, therefore, acts as a pretext for the presentation of Garshin’s favourite anti-militaristic theme.\(^{16}\) The fact that Ivanov is immobilised by his injury and therefore forced to spend four horrific days next to the decomposing corpse of a man whom he has killed is undoubtedly an effective means of forcing him to come to terms with his guilt. Constantly reminded by the body beside him that he is a murderer and unceasingly tortured by his physical anguish, Ivanov seems unable to think of anything but his current situation and its antecedents. However, this relentless focus on the present moment creates a problem: time span. When it comes to the disclosure of in actu experience, according to the DIM ‘eavesdropping’ premise, events cannot be skipped or summarised since gaps and event summary are the prerogative of a narrator who, from his retrospective position, can manipulate information and condense it. A thinker can only verbally register all current experience, which is why the main action in Les lauriers sont coupés and in “Leutnant Gustl” spans only a matter of hours. If an author intends to write a short text and yet wants the events of the story to cover more time than the period actually registered by the mind of his protagonist, he must resort to devices that would motivate such expansion.

In “Four Days” this problem is solved by having a wounded thinker who keeps losing and regaining consciousness. This allows the author to skip long periods of time, which are indicated by gaps in the text and by the character’s verbalisation of his blackouts and reawakenings: ‘Again it’s darkness, again there’s nothing’ [Gap] ‘I awoke’ (p. 22), or ‘My thoughts get confused, and I pass out’ [Gap] ‘I slept for a long time . . . ’ (p. 27). Consequently, even though the actual text of the story is very short, Ivanov’s anguish extends over four days.
This, in turn, increases suspense by augmenting our fear for the protagonist’s life: the longer he lies unattended in the scorching sun, the greater is the likelihood that he will die. Furthermore, because Ivanov is next to the corpse of a man killed in war, the anti-war message of the story is enhanced by this prolongation device, since during those four days the Turk’s body decomposes before the protagonist’s eyes. The graphic description of the decomposition process, along with all the associated guilt and fear in Ivanov’s mind, shows the horror of war in its full ‘glory’: ‘It [the corpse] has disintegrated completely. Myriads of maggots are dropping from it. How they squirm! When they’ve eaten it up and only his bones and uniform are left, then it’ll be my turn. And I’ll be like him’ (p. 31).

Ivanov’s extended anguish, the reader’s uneasy suspense—made all the more vivid by the ‘here and now’ premise of the text—and especially the maximised shock effect generated by the intermittent graphic descriptions of the decomposing Turk made war appear repellent to Garshin’s contemporaries and demystified its ‘glorious’ reputation: “Four Days” was withdrawn by the Ministry of Public Education from schools and public libraries for being anti-patriotic (Henry: p. 52).

However, as with other DIM devices in this story, time prolongation is used inconsistently. There is no attempt to dramatise the blackout and awakening process, since ‘My thoughts get confused, and I pass out’ [Gap] ‘I slept for a long time . . .’ (p. 27) fails to convey the loss of consciousness and its recovery as a scene: the hero sounds too composed and alert, too much like a narrator looking back on the experience. In order to see how the DIM genre developed after Garshin in this respect, let us compare this to the dramatisation of awakening in Les lauriers sont coupés and “Leutnant Gustl.” Dujardin’s character wakes up after a brief dream and realises that he is still in the company of his friend Léa: ‘Ah!!! mille épouvantements!!! quoi? . . . on me pousse, on m’arrache, on me tue . . . Rien . . . un rien . . . la chambre . . . Léa . . . Sapristi . . . m’étais-je endormi? . . .’ (p. 94). Schnitzler’s protagonist, who has fallen asleep on a park bench, awakens even more dramatically:


(p. 166)

This dramatised confusion of semi-conscious states is missing in “Four Days.” It should also be mentioned that, as in Garshin’s story, in “Leutnant Gustl” the hero’s sleep is used to extend the time period covered by the story: the protagonist’s ‘nap,’ which moves the story a few hours ahead in order to make the development of events more believable, is motivated by the fact that Gustl ends up on a park bench in the middle of the night, feels understandably tired and therefore dozes off.

The analysis of illusion-making devices in Garshin’s “Four Days” has provided a picture of communicative ambiguity. In some instances the text creates the impression that story and discourse are simultaneous. However, Garshin did not yet appear to be comfortable with the new form, which caused his character’s DIM to slip into retrospectively-oriented discourse. And yet, this should by no means diminish the author’s accomplishment, for he seems to have made a genuine attempt to make us share the experience of a dying soldier instead of just reading about it. By seeking to synchronise discourse with experience, Garshin tries to move the reader as far away as possible from the artificiality of reading and as close as possible to the genuineness of living. Here it is useful to cite R. Pascal’s comment regarding Sartre’s critique of the traditional form of the novel, the chief falsity of which lies in the narrator (personal or impersonal) who writes from the standpoint of the outcome of the events related, and who thereby profoundly distorts the nature of real experience. The whole pattern of a story, the coherence of its events, is built on this false premise of retrospection, for it is only in retrospect that we can recognize events to be significant or irrelevant and contingent. The nature of living, which Sartre powerfully illustrates from the experience of participating in the Resistance during the war, is quite opposite to that of fiction, since when acting we never know the outcome, we are unsure of effects, and we ignore what is happening elsewhere . . .

(p. 40)

* * *

“Four Days” is the first attempt to recreate the ‘nature of living’ as opposed to the ‘nature of fiction.’ By striving to avoid ‘this false premise of retrospection’ and to create the illusion that Ivanov is ‘acting’ and not narrating, the author appears to be trying to make us feel that, like his terrified protagonist, we too do not ‘know the outcome, we are unsure of effects, and we ignore what is happening elsewhere.’ Ecce bellum, i.e. war not as it is described but as it is lived. And it is not about glory and motherland, but about bodies rotting and being eaten by worms—right now, and not back then. Given the public reaction at the time of this story’s publication, Garshin’s innovative technique must have achieved its purpose. And whatever we may feel today about the shock value of “Four Days,” at the very least we can recognise the potential of present-tense DIM to make discourse come to life.

Notes

1. All translated quotations from Garshin’s story are taken from: V. M. Garshin, Krasnyi tsvetok. Rasskazy,
2. Other notable examples of this genre are E. Dujardin’s Les lauriers sont coupés (1887), V. Larbade’s “Amants, heureux amants” and Mon plus secret conseil (both 1923), and A. Schnitzler’s “Leutnant Gustl” (1900) and “Fräulein Else” (1924).

3. This implies that present-tense DIM lacks the starting point of all first-person narrative: the epic situation, a term used by B. Romberg to designate the particulars of the narrative act itself and its motivation. Epopoia, the Greek origin of the term ‘epic,’ means ‘telling’ or ‘narrating’ in verse, and present-tense DIM excludes epopoia—along with the epic situation—by excluding the public communication protomodel so fundamental for epopoia in particular and all narrative in general.

4. The exception is a fictional narrative in the form of a diary discovered after its author’s death. The person who finds such a diary becomes a framing narrator who presents the second-order text. This is precisely the case in Garshin’s other anti-war story, “The Coward,” written two years after “Four Days” (in 1879). Most of the text consists of a diary kept by the protagonist who is about to be drafted. When he leaves for the Russo-Turkish War, the diary ends and the story is concluded by an impersonal narrator who first refers to the diary and then relates its author’s death in battle.

5. For example, these are the delirious protagonist’s last words, as she dies after having poisoned herself with an overdose of Veronal in Schnitzler’s “Fräulein Else”: ‘Ich fliege ... ich träume ... ich schliefe ... ich träu ... träu-ich flie ...’ (p. 526).

6. As A. Danto points out, ‘any narrative is a structure imposed on events, grouping some of them together with others, and ruling some out as lacking relevance ...’ (p. 526).

7. Any similar restriction of a conventional narrator’s field of knowledge and retrospective distance would take us into the realm of figural narrative—perception filtered through the mind of the experiencing self—which represents a step towards the communicative position of a DIM thinker.

8. This, according to V. Shklovsky, is a device employed to de-automatise our perception of familiar and therefore often overlooked phenomena in order to make us notice them or see them from a different perspective.

9. On this, see J. Hawthorn: ‘... interior dialogue is much more formal than is interior monologue—otherwise the characterization of different speakers would not be possible. We find in it none of the characteristic deletions and abridgements of interior monologue; the utterance of interior dialogue could, generally, be transplanted into scenes of actual dialogue with little or no linguistic adaption’ (p. 87).

10. ‘The most widespread conception of dialogue as a direct exchange of opinions or information is but one of the possible forms of dialogue, it is far from being the only one. This form of dialogue can be observed only in certain specific conditions. In those conditions where two or more interlocutors are engaged ... the opponent need not necessarily be a different person; he may merely be a different person; he may merely be a different value system, a different form of speech behaviour, a different conception, a different consciousness.’

11. B. Kroll’s observations indicate that ‘subordination in sentence structure is a “planned” activity not occurring in speech or presumably in interior monologue ... we would expect that communication which is planned and allows time for encoding information in more “difficult” structures will exhibit a greater degree of combined ideas than communication which is spontaneous and encoded under pressure of time, which does not allow the communicator to use those combining strategies which require major manipulations of word order and sentence structure.’ (Quoted by Clines: p. 32; my italics, V.T.)

12. ‘... a periodic sentence is any sentence in which the completion of main clause subject and verb is postponed. Previous studies indicate that such a syntactic structure involves a greater level of planned activity and is a more complex syntactic unit than its counterpart—a loose sentence structure, where cumulative modifiers are added to the main clause after completion of the subject and verb’ (p. 37).

13. Note the following comments by Ochs: ‘In using context, the communicator does not make the semantic relation between the propositions explicit. For example, if the communicator produces the sequence “I don’t like that house. It looks strange,” he does not specify the links between these assessments ... Our observations of discourse indicate that context is an alternative to syntax and that planned and unplanned discourse differ in their utilization of the two alternatives. Syntax makes the semantic link explicit, for example, I don’t like that house, because it looks strange. It is relied upon more heavily in planned versus relatively unplanned discourse’ (p. 66).

14. The complexity and length of sentences in Les lauriers sont coupés, a DIM written ten years after “Four Days,” are considerably reduced, resulting
in much more ‘believable’ syntax. The following fragmented verbalisation of Dujardin’s hero, as he dresses, indicates the development of the technique. ‘Une chemise blanche; hâtons-nous; les boutons des manches, du col; ah! le linge frais; que je suis bête! dépêchons-nous; dans ma chambre; ma cravate; mes bretelles sont laides, je les ai affreusement choisies; mon gilet; dans la poche, ma montre, ma jaquette . . .’ (p. 65).

15. The indirect indication of action—the waiter’s attempt to take the protagonist’s coat—is another sign of how the DIM genre developed after Garshin.

16. ‘The [typical] Garshinian hero . . . is forced to be introspective, because he is usually faced with a moral dilemma . . . In Four Days, for example, the events leading up to the murder [of the Turk] and the murder itself are dispensed with in one page. The story’s significance lies in Ivanov’s reaction to the murder, in his ponderings on war and death . . .’ (Yarwood, 1981: p. 87). Cf. also Cohn (p. 222) and Yarwood (1981: p. 88).

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Martine Artz (essay date 2000)


[In the following essay, Artz examines critics’ motivations in the reception of Garshin’s most famous work. While the practice of “claiming an author”—that is, proposing to speak on an author’s behalf or in his name—was more prevalent during the Soviet period than at other times, it was also a prominent feature of debates among critics in Garshin’s day.]